ICG Report – ‘Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?’
March 7th, 2007
The International Crisis Group released a report on Zimbabwe (5 March 2007) with a question as its title: Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?.
Click here to download the full report as a pdf file
This is the opening sentence of the Executive Summary:
After years of political deadlock and continued economic and humanitarian decline, a realistic chance has at last begun to appear in the past few months to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis, by retirement of President Robert Mugabe, a power-sharing transitional government, a new constitution and elections.
The questionmark, however, adds uncertainty to the title, and it’s clear that some of that uncertainty hinges on the MDC split. The Summary issues this stark warning – and I hope leaders and decision makers in both MDC factions are taking note!:
The desire to remove Mugabe within the year provides a rare rallying point that cuts across partisan affiliations, and ethnic and regional identities. Opposition party leaders are keeping lines of communication open with the ZANU-PF dissidents while preparing for a non-violent campaign to demand immediate constitutional reform. The MDC’s credibility and effectiveness, however, will be severely compromised unless efforts underway to reconcile its competing factions led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara succeed.
These are the report recommendations highlighted in the Summary:
To the Government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF:
1. Abandon plans to extend President Mugabe’s term beyond its expiration in March 2008 and support SADC-led negotiations to implement an exit strategy for him no later than that date.
2. Negotiate with the MDC on a constitutional framework, power-sharing agreement, detailed agenda and benchmarks for a two-year political transition, beginning in March 2008, including:
(a) adoption of a constitutional amendment in the July 2007 parliamentary session providing for nomination in March 2008, by two-thirds majority, of a non-executive president, an executive prime minister and de-linking of government and ZANU-PF party positions;
(b) a power-sharing agreement leading in early 2008 to a transitional government, including ZANU-PF and the MDC, tasked with producing a new draft constitution, repealing repressive laws, drawing up a new voters roll and demilitarising and depoliticising state institutions in accordance with agreed timelines and benchmarks, and leading to internationally supervised elections in 2010; and
(c) implementation of an emergency economic recovery plan to curb inflation, restore donor and foreign investor confidence and boost mining and agricultural production, including establishment of a Land Commission with a strong technocratic base and wide representation of Zimbabwean stakeholders to recommend policies aimed at ending the land crisis.
3. Abandon plans for a new urban displacement program and act to redress the damage done by Operation Murambatsvina by:
(a) providing shelter to its homeless victims; and
(b) implementing the recommendations of the Tibaijuka Report, including compensation for those whose property was destroyed, unhindered access for humanitarian workers and aid and creation of an environment for effective reconstruction and resettlement.
To the Movement for Democratic Change:4. Proceed with internal efforts to establish minimum unity within the party and a common front for dealing with the government and ZANU-PF and contesting presidential and parliamentary elections, while retaining reunification as the ultimate goal.
5. Hold internal consultations between faction leaders to adopt a joint strategy aiming at:
(a) finalising negotiations with ZANU-PF over constitutional reforms, a power-sharing agreement and formation of a transitional government in March 2008; and
(b) preparing for a March 2008 presidential election if negotiations with ZANU-PF fail, and President Mugabe retains power.
To Zimbabwean and South African Civil Society Organisations:6. Initiate legal proceedings in South African courts to attach any assets stolen from the Zimbabwean government and transferred to or invested in South Africa and to obtain the arrest and prosecution of egregious Zimbabwean human rights abusers visiting South Africa.
To SADC and South Africa:
7. Engage with the U.S. and the EU to adopt a joint strategy for resolving the crisis that includes:
(a) mediation by SADC of negotiations for an exit deal on expiration of President Mugabe’s term in 2008 and of an agreement between ZANU-PF and the MDC on a power-sharing transitional government to oversee development of a new constitution, repeal repressive laws and hold internationally supervised presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010; and
(b) understandings on the use by the U.S. and EU of incentives and disincentives to support the strategy in regard to targeted sanctions, political relations with the transitional government and resumption of assistance.
8. Engage with the Zimbabwe government to facilitate talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC leading to the above steps.
9. Convene an urgent meeting of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation to consider the regional consequences of the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe and recommend action by the Heads of State summit to deal with the situation.
To the United States and the European Union:
10. Engage with SADC countries to adopt the above-mentioned joint strategy, including understandings on timelines and benchmarks to be met by the Zimbabwean authorities in restoring and implementing a democratic process.
11. Increase pressure on President Mugabe and other ZANU-PF leaders if they do not cooperate with efforts to begin a transition and restore democracy, including by taking the following measures to close loopholes in targeted personal sanctions:
(a) apply the sanctions also to family members and business associates of those on the lists;
(b) cancel visas and residence permits of those on the lists and their family members; and
(c) add Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono to the EU list.
12. Portugal, holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2007, should not invite President Mugabe and other members of the Zimbabwe government or ZANU-PF on the EU targeted sanctions list to the EU-AU summit unless significant reforms have already been undertaken.
13. Increase funding for training and other capacity-building assistance to democratic forces in Zimbabwe.
To the United Nations Secretary-General:
14. Assign a senior official – a new Special Envoy to Zimbabwe, the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Africa or a high-level member of the Department of Political Affairs – responsibility for the Zimbabwe portfolio including to support the SADC-led initiative, and monitor the situation for the Secretary General.
To the United Nations Security Council:
15. Begin discussions aimed at placing the situation in Zimbabwe on the agenda as a threat to international peace and security.
To the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or in the alternative the Human Rights Council:
16. Initiate a follow-up investigation on the Tibaijuka Report, including plans for a new urban displacement campaign, arrests of informal miners and political repression, and recommend actions to the member states, the Security Council and the Secretariat.
To the Commonwealth Secretariat:
17. Encourage Commonwealth member countries in Southern Africa to help mediate a political settlement for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, setting benchmarks for a return of the country to the organisation.
18. Establish a group of Eminent Persons to engage with Zimbabwe, using the good offices of its regional members to facilitate access.
19. Work through Commonwealth civil society organisations to build up civil society capacity in Zimbabwe.
Pretoria/Brussels, 5 March 2007
