Does Electoral Competition Cause Post-Election Intimidation and Violence? Evidence from the March 29, 2008 Zimbabwean General Election

A Paper Presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Association  of Third World Studies, Cape Coast, Ghana, November 21-24, 2009

Author: John Hickman

Introduction

Are post-election intimidation and violence attributable to intense electoral competition? This paper presents answers to that question based on empirical findings from an analysis of the events immediately following balloting in the 2008 general election in Zimbabwe, a time period marked by thousands of incidents involving threats and physical attacks. The scholarly warrant for this research is that post-election intimidation and violence merit research as political phenomena that are important for reasons that involve both normative and practical policy-making interests and that have not been much studied. Indeed, while the published research about intimidation and violence before and during balloting comprises a small literature, the published research about post-election intimidation and violence hardly comprises a literature at all.

The general normative interest in electoral intimidation and violence is that safeguarding the right to vote without fear is that people appear to value the right to participate beyond the specific outcomes of elections (Benz 2007: 210; Guth and Weck-Hannemann 1997).  The procedural utility they derive from participation in elections is an enhanced sense of personal well being from the, “feeling of being involved and having political influence” and “inclusion, identity, and self-determination” (Benz 2007: 212). These feelings fulfill innate needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Benz 2007: 203). That probably accounts for the determination of some voters to participate in elections despite the risk of threat or physical attack. Notwithstanding the courage of some voters, public opinion research suggests that the experience of intimidation deters some from voting both in the near term and over the long term (Bratton 2008: 626). The general normative interest in electoral intimidation and violence is independent of both the purposes sought by its perpetrators and its effectiveness. These behaviors are morally repugnant whether their purpose is simply retributive or instrumentally rational.

The general practical or policy-making interest in electoral intimidation and violence is that they constitute what liberal societies would otherwise deem to be criminal behavior (Bratton 2008: 623). Policy making about electoral intimidation and violence begins with moral outrage but then moves to consideration of he economics of crime: “the cost imposed on society by the criminal act; the benefit to the criminal of committing the act; the cost of resources used to maintain the expected punishment” (Winter 2008: 13). Where the authorities are not among the perpetrators or otherwise complicit, then a straightforward economic policy analysis may be warranted. How much effort should the state devote to preventing and punishing electoral violence and intimidation? Beyond the importance of deterring violent crime of any sort through prevention and punishment, the importance of specifically deterring electoral intimidation and violence lies in the value of deterring highly publicized violent crime that may have a demonstration effect by indicating the weakness of social restraint and in its instrumental effectiveness either by reducing voter turnout or by enhancing the chances of winning by parties and candidates whose supporters are perpetrators. Therefore, if the authorities are not among the perpetrators or otherwise complicit, and if electoral intimidation and violence are neither highly publicized nor effective, then they may not merit policing and prosecution efforts different in intensity from ordinary violent crime. However, if the electoral intimidation and violence are highly publicized and effective, and if the authorities are among the perpetrators or otherwise complicit, then straightforward economic policy analysis of crime is insufficient. In such circumstances the equality of treatment expected under the rule of law is violated, and the practical or policy-making interest therefore becomes inseparable from the normative interest. So powerful are the normative interests implicated in widespread electoral intimidation and violence by the authorities that some citizens may ignore patriotic pride and willingly endorse international investigation to expose the pathology (Gettleman November 6 2009: A6). As such it may internationalize what would normally be a national political controversy. Independent news coverage indicates that the state was complicit in the highly publicized and widespread post-election violence in Zimbabwe in 2008 (Shaw June 22, 2008).

This research is justifiable because it attempts to answer, however preliminarily, an inquiry about a contradiction between moral goods: legitimacy and contestation. Beyond the toll of emotionally traumatized, wounded or dead, post-election intimidation and violence threaten the legitimacy of immediate election outcome, and more generally of elections as a method of selecting officials. If the intensity of electoral competition is associated with post election intimidation and violence (Manning 2005: 721), then that poses a fundamental conflict in moral goods because electoral contestation is crucial if elected officials are to be responsive and accountable to citizens.

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